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ARTICLE
UNWELCOME GUESTS: DISABLED PEOPLE
AND THE NEW EUGENICS
STEPHEN L.  MIKOCHIK*
At present, four states permit assisted suicide by statute or ballot initia-
tive.1 All require a terminal condition as a prerequisite,2 and three expressly
forbid writing the lethal prescription “solely” based on disability.3 Why
then are disabled people so concerned about the rise of such legislation?
Simply put, they are unwelcome guests and fear that assisted suicide will
extend the unmistakable hint that they should leave.
The threat has its origins in the abortion of fetuses with genetic anoma-
lies. We know, for example, that up to 85% of fetuses diagnosed with
Down syndrome are aborted;4 and rates for fetuses diagnosed with other
serious anomalies are likely similar.5 As prenatal testing advances,6 we can
expect comparable numbers for other genetic conditions. Laws declaring
the equal dignity of a class of people7 ring hollow when society makes it
abundantly clear that they are not welcome in the first place.
* The author is Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law at Temple University in Philadel-
phia, a former disability rights attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, and past Chair of the
National Catholic Partnership on Disability. He presently is Visiting Professor of Jurisprudence at
Ave Maria Law School in Florida.
1. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–897 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010–904 (2014);
VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18, §§ 5281–93 (2015); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.1–22 (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.). Additionally,
the Montana Supreme Court held in 2009 that physician-assisted suicide was not against that
state’s public policy. See Baxter v. Montana, 2009 MT 449, ¶ 49, 354 Mont. 234, 224 P.3d 1211.
2. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805(1); WASH. REV. STAT. § 70.245.020(1); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT.
18, § 5283(a); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016
Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.).
3.  OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805(2); WASH. REV. STAT. § 70.245.020(2); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 443.2(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of
2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.).
4. Erin Biba, Early Warning System, WIRED, Jan. 1, 2013, 2013 WLNR 4557607.
5. Simple blood tests early in pregnancy can screen for other chromosomal disorders be-
sides Down syndrome, including Edwards, Patau, Turner, and Klinefelter syndromes. See id.
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2012).
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Next, if a severely disabled child makes it through the birth canal, he
will first face in the neonatal unit the chance of infanticide by neglect8 and
then, should he survive, the continuing prospect of having needed treatment
declared “futile.” That practice permits doctors to refuse provision of medi-
cal treatment they consider inappropriate, over patient or family objec-
tions.9 The danger is that doctors will refuse treatment to patients whose
lives they consider not worth living.10 The most egregious example is a
Texas law, allowing doctors to refuse life-sustaining treatment for patients
incapable of caring for themselves or making medical decisions due to an
“irreversible condition.”11 If such refusal is affirmed by the hospital ethics
committee—and there are no standards to ensure that the review is made on
the quality of the treatment rather than the quality of the patient’s life—the
patient has ten days to find another hospital willing to provide treatment
before most life-support ends.12 Given the high cost of care, the chance of
finding a willing provider is slim.13
Finally, if all else fails, there is the offer of assistance in suicide. True,
it is presently limited to patients with terminal conditions; but, as the prac-
tice takes hold, legislatures will doubtlessly extend the offer to people
“solely” based on their disabilities.  The incentive is simple: “[T]he primary
reasons terminal patients give for requesting aid in dying—loss of auton-
omy, loss of dignity, inability to participate in activities that make life en-
joyable—are the same reasons disabled people seek suicide. If people with
8. See David P. Mortimer, The New Eugenics and the Newborn: The Historical
“Cousinage” of Eugenics and Infanticide, Ethics & Med., Oct. 1, 2003, at 155–69, 2003 WLNR
19752870.
9. See American Medical Association, Opinion 2.035 - Futile Care, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2035.page (last
visited Feb. 27, 2016).
10. See New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Others Must Choose: Decid-
ing for Patients Without Capacity 196–97 (1992).
11. The statute permits physicians to refuse patients life-sustaining treatment if confirmed by
the hospital’s ethics committee. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West, Westlaw
current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature 2016). Qualifying
patients include those with terminal or irreversible conditions. Id. § 166.031(2). The latter term
means a condition “that may be treated but is never cured or eliminated; . . . that leaves a person
unable to care for or make decisions for the person’s own self; and . . . that, without life-sustaining
treatment[,] . . . is fatal.” Id. § 166.002(9).
12. Id. § 166.046(e). Happily, the artificial administration of nutrition and hydration was
exempted from this exclusion by amendment in 2015. Id.
13. It is worth noting that ObamaCare left the door largely open for taking quality of life into
consideration when evaluating the effectiveness of clinical research: “Of the numerous instances
where the Act authorizes adoption of quality measures, in one case only is the Secretary of Health
and Human Services expressly forbidden from relying on comparative clinical effectiveness re-
search that discounts the lives of disabled people.” Stephen L. Mikochik, Rationing Human Life:
Health Care Reform and Disabled People, 26 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 199, 204 (2011). See id. at
201, n.8 (“As defined in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the term ‘comparative
clinical effectiveness research’ means ‘research evaluating and comparing health outcomes and
the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and
items. . . .’” (citations omitted)).
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only six months to live can end such distress, why not those who face it for
a lifetime?”14 As the Supreme Court has observed, “[a]n insidious bias
against the handicapped—. . . coupled with a cost-saving mentality—makes
them especially in need of . . . statutory protection.”15 Yet, the protections
states have enacted, rather than safeguarding patients’ choice, provide a rec-
ipe for their abuse instead.16
Those who argue that such concerns will dissipate if safeguards are
tightened fail to recognize the “real risk of subtle coercion and undue influ-
ence in end-of-life situations.”17 Those who argue that dignity is affirmed
when disabled people are given the right to choose to make themselves
dead underestimate how devalued they are in society; how internalized such
attitudes can become; how attractive the hint to leave can then appear. Fi-
nally, those who argue that assisted suicide is no prelude to euthanasia for-
get that unwelcome guests who “can’t take a hint” are eventually helped to
leave.
With the passage of A.B. 15 last year, California became the fourth
state to permit assisted suicide by statute or ballot initiative. What follows is
a letter to Gerry Brown,18 detailing the bill’s many dangers and urging,
unsuccessfully, veto of such foolhardy legislation:
September 1, 2015
The Honorable Edmund G. Brown Jr.
c/o State Capitol, Suite 1173
Sacramento, CA 95814
Re: Assembly Bill 15, “End of Life Option Act”
Dear Governor Brown:
My name is Stephen L. Mikochik.19 I am Professor Emeritus of
Constitutional Law at Temple University in Philadelphia and past
Chair of the National Catholic Partnership on Disability
(NCPD).  NCPD was established thirty years ago to implement
the Pastoral Statement on People with Disabilities of the U.S.
Catholic bishops. On behalf of NCPD and the thousands of dis-
abled Catholics it serves, I would urge you, should it reach your
desk, to veto Assembly Bill (AB) 15 that, in legalizing assisted
suicide, is an open invitation to patient abuse.
14. Letter of Stephen L. Mikochik to Gov. Edmund G. Brown on A.B. 15 (Sept. 1, 2015)
[hereinafter Brown Letter] (attached to this commentary).
15. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) (quoting Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995) (panel decision)).
16. See infra Brown Letter notes 48–64 and accompanying text.
17. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732 (citations omitted).
18. We have edited the form of some citations and updated certain references to reflect
changes that have occurred since the letter was written.
19. B.A., M.A. in Rel. Stud., M.A. in Phil., J.D., LL.M.
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A brief survey of legal history will place my concerns in context.
For over seven hundred years, Anglo-American law has con-
demned suicide.20 Self-murder was a felony at common law; but
since the deceased was beyond penalty, his property was forfeited
as a deterrent to others.21 Recognizing the harm this caused inno-
cent families, English and American law gradually decriminal-
ized suicide.22 This development, however, did not mark the
moral acceptance of suicide since aiding its commission re-
mained a common law offense.23 At the close of the Civil War,
most states criminalized assisting a suicide.24 By 1997, when the
Supreme Court rejected the claim that physician-assisted suicide
was a constitutional right,25 the vast majority of states had made
it criminal.26
Nevertheless, assisted suicide has recently become controversial
and, spearheaded by Compassion and Choices, the successor to
the Hemlock Society,27 has gained a foothold in American law. By
ballot initiative in 1994, Oregon became the first state to allow
physician-assisted suicide.28 Its so-called “Death with Dignity
Act” set the pattern for the successful 2008 ballot initiative in
Washington State.29 The Vermont legislature adopted its own ver-
sion in 2013,30 while the Montana Supreme Court held in 2009
that physician-assisted suicide was not against that state’s public
policy.31 All other attempts to legalize assisted suicide, either by
ballot initiative or legislative enactment, have failed. In 2014, for
example, the New Hampshire House of Representatives defeated
H.B. 1325 by a vote of 219 to 66;32 and last year alone, legisla-
tive initiatives in Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Ma-
ryland, Nevada, New York, Utah, and Wyoming have failed.
20. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
21. See id. at 711–13.
22. See id. at 713.
23. See id. at 713–14.
24. See id. at 715.
25. See id. at 728.
26. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718.
27. See IAN DOWBIGGIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA 146 (2007).
28. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–97 (2015).
29. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010–904 (2014).
30. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–93 (2015).
31. See Baxter, 354 Mont. 234 at ¶¶ 49–50. An Albuquerque district judge in 2014 barred
prosecution of physicians for assisting the suicide of terminal patients. James Monteleone, Death
Aid Case Appeal Possible, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.abqjournal.com/342190/
news/attorney-general-might-appeal-ruling-on-assisted-suicide.html. The New Mexico Attorney
General appealed that ruling. Alex Schadenberg, New Mexico Attorney General Appeals Court
Ruling to Legalize Assisted Suicide, LIFE NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.lifenews.com/2014/
03/12/new-mexico-attorney-general-appeals-court-ruling-to-legalize-assisted-suicide.html. The
decision was reversed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals on August 11, 2015. Morris v. Bran-
denburg, 2015–NMCA–100, ¶ 54, 356 P.3d 564 (N.M. Ct. App.).
32. See ‘Death with Dignity Act’ finds little support in NH House, UNION LEADER (Mar. 6,
2014), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20140306/NEWS0621/140309414.
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Before turning to the specifics of AB 15, I will address three
threshold questions. First, how can laws that require consent con-
stitute government decisions about what lives are worth living?
Americans hold as self-evident that all men are “endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these
[is the right to] life . . . [and] [t]hat, to secure these rights, gov-
ernments are instituted among men. . .”33 As life is an unalien-
able right, we can neither destroy our lives nor ask others to
assist in their destruction.34 When government secures such rights
for some but not others, when it relaxes laws against aiding the
suicide of terminal patients but not the able-bodied, it is saying
this class deserves less protection of their lives, its members de-
serve less safeguards of their unalienable rights, in other words,
they deserve less respect because in some way they are less
human. In discounting such rights entrusted to its care, govern-
ment thus compromises the very grounds on which it is instituted.
Second, how can ingesting a lethal drug constitute suicide when
the patient is already dying from a terminal condition?35 If the
terminal prognosis is wrong, the lethal drug is the sole cause of
death. If correct, it is an intervening cause. In either event, it is
the cause in fact and, as either the sole or intervening cause, the
legal cause of death.36 Thus, the patient dies, not from the under-
lying condition, but from ingesting the lethal drug that, if self-
administered, constitutes suicide.
Third, why should the disabled community in particular concern
itself with laws legalizing assisted suicide that, on their face, are
limited to terminal patients? As physical impairments that sub-
stantially limit life activities,37 terminal conditions are disabili-
ties. Thus, to provide, as does AB 15, that a patient is not
qualified for assistance in suicide “solely” because of a disabil-
ity38 is simply incoherent. Moreover, those with disabling condi-
33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).
34. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Ch. IV, § 23, http://
www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr04.htm (“[F]or a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot,
by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute,
arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. Nobody can give more power
than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over
it.”).
35. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016
Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.) (implying that the underlying condition, not the
lethal drug, is the cause of death).
36. Even if ingesting the lethal drug is regarded as merely hastening the patient’s death from
the underlying terminal condition, it remains a cause in fact and a legal cause of death. See Ox-
endine v. State, 528 A.2d 870, 872–73 (Del. 1987) (an act that accelerates death from a prior
lethal act is an actual cause of death). See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 198–99 (4th ed. 2006).
37. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
38. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg.
Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.).
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tions which can cause death within six months, but only if
treatment were removed, are terminal for purposes of AB 15.39
The high cost of keeping such people alive40 will provide insur-
ance carriers a powerful incentive merely to pay for a handful of
barbiturates instead.41
Additionally, predictions of death within six months required for
“aid in dying”42 are notoriously fallible.43 Thus, even if terminal
and disabling conditions are different, the separating line is po-
rous.44 Further, people with disabilities are more likely than
others to develop potentially terminal conditions and thus more
likely than others to become candidates for “aid in dying.”45
Finally, the primary reasons terminal patients give for requesting
aid in dying—loss of autonomy, loss of dignity, inability to par-
ticipate in activities that make life enjoyable46—are the same rea-
sons disabled people seek suicide.47 If people with only six
39. The definition of “terminal disease” fails to specify that the condition will result in death
within six months “notwithstanding available treatment.” Id. § 443.1(q).
40. Medicare, for example, paid $72,000 annually for patient kidney dialysis in 2009. U.S.
Renal Data System 2009 Annual Data Report, http://www.usrds.org. In contrast, secobarbital
(Seconal) retails for $5.23 per 100 mgs; and pentobarbital (Numbutal) for $20.65 per 50 mgs.
DrugBank.ca: Secobarbital, http://www.drugbank.ca/drugs/DB00418, and DrugBank.ca: Pento
barbital, http://www.drugbank.ca/drugs/DB00312.
41. Though AB 15 forbids any communication between insurance carriers and individuals
from including “both the denial of treatment and information as to the availability of aid-in-dying
drug coverage[,]” such information can be provided separately on request. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 443.13(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of
2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.).
42. See id. § 443.1(q).
43. As a prognostic standard, “reasonable medical judgment,” id., requires the attending phy-
sician to predict that the underlying condition will, “more likely than not, RESULT IN DEATH
WITHIN 6 MONTHS.” Cf. S.B. 676, § 5–6A–03(c) (Md. 2015) (emphasis added) (paraphrasing
“reasonable medical judgment” in such lay terms).
44. Of course, for those who die from a lethal prescription, their terminal prognosis is a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
45. See Disability Status as an Antecedent to Chronic Conditions: National Health Interview
Survey, 2006–2012, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/
2014/13_0251.htm (“After adjusting for sociodemographic differences, adults with lifelong disa-
bilities had increased odds of having the following chronic conditions compared with adults with
no limitations: coronary heart disease (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 2.92 . . .) cancer (AOR =
1.61. . .) diabetes (AOR = 2.57. . .) . . . and hypertension (AOR = 2.18. . . .)).
46. As in prior years, the three most frequently mentioned end-of-life concerns reported by
Oregon in 2014 were: “loss of autonomy” in 91.4% of cases, “decreasing ability to participate in
activities that made life enjoyable” in 86.7% of cases, and “loss of dignity” in 71.4% of cases. See
REP. OF OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, 2014, https://public.health.
oregon.gov/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/deathwithdignityact/documents/year17.
pdf [hereinafter OREGON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT] . Washington State reported similar
findings for 2014. See WASH. DEPT. PUB. HEALTH, 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, http://
www.doh.wa.gov/portals/1/Documents/Pubs/422-109-DeathWithDignityAct2014.pdf [hereinafter
WASHINGTON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT] .
47. Cf. Diane Coleman, State’s Rights Versus Civil Rights, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER
(Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/opinion/article/States-rights-versus-civil-rights-
1183888.php.
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months to live can end such distress, why not those who face it for
a lifetime?48
Turning to the specifics of AB 15, it is first worth noting that
nothing in its terms requires the presence of or potential for insuf-
ferable pain as a qualifying condition.49 Further, its language
tracks the provisions of, and thus shares the major flaws in, the
assisted suicide laws enacted by Oregon and Washington State.
Though it imposes a waiting period before the prescription is
written, patients can have a lethal drug in hand fifteen days after
the terminal diagnosis is made,50 clearly insufficient time to accli-
mate to a terminal prognosis.
Though either the attending or consulting physician can refer pa-
tients for psychological or psychiatric evaluation if they suspect
clinical depression or other mental disorders that can impair
judgment,51 many physicians lack training to recognize such de-
48. See, e.g., Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 2d Sess.
127–38 (1996) (prepared testimony of Herbert Hendin, MD). Dr. Hendin testified:
Over the past two decades, the Netherlands has moved from assisted suicide to euthana-
sia, from euthanasia for the terminally ill to euthanasia for the chronically ill, from
euthanasia for physical illness to euthanasia for psychological distress and from volun-
tary euthanasia to nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Once the Dutch accepted
assisted suicide it was not possible legally or morally to deny more active medical help
i.e., euthanasia to those who could not affect their own deaths. Nor could they deny
assisted suicide or euthanasia to the chronically ill who have longer to suffer than the
terminally ill or to those who have psychological pain not associated with physical dis-
ease. To do so would be a form of discrimination.
It was reported that “five children were euthanized in the Netherlands between 2002 and 2015: a
12 year-old and four young people aged 16 to 17.” Dutch pediatricians give terminally ill children
under 12 the right to die, THE GUARDIAN (June 19, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/society/
2015/jun/19/terminally-ill-children-right-to-die-euthanasia-netherlands. Besides the Netherlands,
three other European nations—Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland—now “openly, legally,”
authorize assisted suicide or euthanasia. World Laws on Assisted Suicide, EUTHANASIA RES. AND
GUIDANCE ORG., http://www.finalexit.org/assisted_suicide_world_laws_page2.html.
In 2012 alone, Belgium recorded “[Fifty-two] cases of euthanasia on psychological grounds [two
for every 100,000 persons.]” Belgian helped to die after three sex change operations, BBC NEWS
EUR. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24373107. At that rate, the total of
such deaths in the United States for 2012 would have been over thirty times greater.
49. Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2(a–b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016
Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.) (listing qualifying conditions); Id. § 443.1(q)
(defining “terminal disease” as “an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, result in death within six months.”).
50. See id. § 443.3(a) (a patient seeking a lethal prescription “shall submit two oral requests,
a minimum of 15 days apart, and a written request. . . .”). Cf. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.840,
127.850; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.090, 70.245.110(1) (2009). Both Oregon and Washington
State, however, additionally require a forty-eight hour waiting period between signing the written
request and writing the lethal prescription. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.850; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.245.110(2) (2009).
51. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5(a)(1)(ii) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of
2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.) (“If there are indications of a mental
disorder, the [attending] physician shall refer the individual for a mental health specialist assess-
ment.”); Id. § 443.6(d) (same for consulting physician). Cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (“If in the
opinion of the attending physician or the consulting physician a patient may be suffering from a
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pression;52 and nothing in AB 15 or its exemplars requires that
they have it. Not surprisingly, referrals were almost never made
in the seventeen-year history of the Oregon Act and, thus far,
Washington is following suit.53  Given that the Supreme Court has
reported that many people, terminal or not, seeking suicide suffer
from clinical depression and often lose the urge when the condi-
tion is treated,54 the absence of reported referrals in these states
is most troubling for the future of AB 15.
Further, the bill allows persons with a financial interest in the
patient’s death to be one of the two witnesses to the written re-
quest, attesting to the patient’s competence and the lack of coer-
cion.55 Though patients can revoke their request “in any
psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment, either physician
shall refer the patient for counseling.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.060 (2009) (same).
52. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730–31 (“[A] New York [blue-ribbon] [t]ask
[f]orce, however, expressed its concern that, because depression is difficult to diagnose, physi-
cians and medical professionals often fail to respond adequately to seriously ill patients’ needs.”
(citations omitted)).
53. For example, of the 105 Oregon residents who died from a lethal prescription in 2014,
only three had been referred for a psychiatric or psychological evaluation. See OREGON’S 2014
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, supra note 46. Oregon’s yearly reports from 1998 through 2013 reveal
similar statistics; showing: two out of seventy-one in 2013, two out of seventy-seven in 2012, one
out of seventy-one in 2011, one out of sixty-one in 2010, zero out of fifty-nine in 2009, two out of
sixty in 2008, zero out of forty-nine in 2007, two out of forty-six in 2006, two out of thirty-eight
in 2005, two out of thirty-seven in 2004, two out of forty-two in 2003, five out of thirty-eight in
2002, three out of twenty-one in 2001, five out of twenty-seven in 2000, ten out of twenty-seven
in 1999, four out of twenty-one in 1998 were referred for evaluation. See Or. Death with Dignity
Act Annual Reps., OREGON.GOV, https://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/Eval-
uationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Pages/ar-index.aspx. Similarly, in Washington State, of the
176 residents for whom lethal drugs were dispensed in 2014, only six had been referred for such
evaluation. See WASHINGTON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT REPORT, supra note 46. Washing-
ton State’s yearly reports from 2009 through 2013 reveal similar statistics; showing: six out of 173
in 2013, three out of 121 in 2012, five out of 103 in 2011, three out of eighty-seven in 2010, three
out of sixty-three in 2009 were referred for evaluation. See Wash. Death with Dignity Act Annual
Reps., WASH. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, http://www.doh.wa.gov/YouandYourFamily/Illnessand
Disease/DeathwithDignityAct/DeathwithDignityData.
54. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730–31 (“Research indicates . . . that many people who
request physician-assisted suicide withdraw that request if their depression and pain are treated.”
(citations omitted)).
55. “Only one of the two witnesses at the time the written request is signed may . . . be
entitled to a portion of the . . . [patient’s] estate upon death.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 443.3(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex.
Sess.). Cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810(2)(b); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.030(2)(b) (2009). “Only
one of the two witnesses at the time the written request is signed may . . . [o]wn, operate, or be
employed at a health care facility where the . . . [patient] is receiving medical treatment or re-
sides.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.3(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg.
Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.). Cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810(2)(c); WASH. REV.
CODE § 70.245.030(2)(c) (2009). Since its two parts are separate, Subsection C would allow an
interested heir as one witness and an owner, operator, or employee of the health care facility
where the patient resides as the other. The latter witness could also have a financial interest in the
patient’s death, for example, to “free up the bed” for a paying resident. Finally, if the phrase,
“[t]he request shall be witnessed by at least two other adult persons” in Section 443.3(b)(3), is
meant to add a second layer of informal witnesses, they would not necessarily come under the
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manner[,]”56 including, for those with difficulty speaking, “com-
municating through a person familiar with the patient’s manner
of communicating[,]”57 nothing prevents the interested witness to
the patient’s written request from filling that role.58 That same
person can be the only witness present when the lethal drug is
taken since AB 15 fails to require an objective observer to the act.
This is an open invitation to patient abuse59 since no one will
know if the patient resisted.60 The bill compounds the problem by
repeatedly referring to patients “ingesting”61 (that is, swallow-
ing), rather than “self-administering,”62 the lethal drug, blurring
the line between assisted suicide and euthanasia.63
Astonishingly, under AB 15, information the attending physician
must provide the Department of Public Health,64 including the
circumstances and cause of the patient’s death,65 “shall not be
disclosed, discoverable, or compelled to be produced in any civil,
restriction against having a financial interest in the patient’s death. Consequently, it is reasonable
to construe “two other adult persons” as the witnesses already required by the prior paragraph.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.3(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg.
Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.) (“The request shall be signed and dated, in the
presence of two witnesses. . . .”).
56. Id. § 443.5(a)(6).
57. Id. § 443.1(d).
58. Though AB 15 provides several safeguards for non-English speakers, see, e.g., id.
§ 443.11(b)(3) (translators who prepare written requests for lethal drugs in English shall not be
“entitled to a portion of the . . . [patients’] estate upon death”), none apply to patients who are non-
verbal or have difficulty speaking.
59. See generally Margaret K. Dore, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Recipe for Elder Abuse
and the Illusion of Personal Choice, 36 VT. B.J. 53 (2011) (discussing patient abuse).
60. Secobarbital (Seconal) and pentobarbital (Nembutal) are the drugs most prescribed in
Oregon and Washington State for aid in suicide. See OREGON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT,
supra note 46; WASHINGTON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, supra note 46. Both drugs are
water-soluble and can be mixed with alcohol, for example, in a reluctant patient’s drink. See
Seconal Sodium (Secobarbital Sodium Capsules) Drug Information, http://www.rxlist.com/seco-
nal-sodium-drug.htm; Nembutal (Pentobarbital) Drug Information, http://www.rxlist.com/
nembutal-drug.htm.
61. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(i)(4) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016
Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.) (“Informed decision’ means . . . [a decision]
that is made after being fully informed of . . . [t]he possibility that the individual . . . may obtain
the drug but may decide not to ingest it”); id. §443.4 (“An individual may at any time . . . decide
not to ingest an aid-in dying drug”); id. §§ 443.5(a)(2)(B–C), (5)(A–B, E) (“Before prescribing an
aid-in-dying drug, the attending physician shall  . . . [c]onfirm that the individual is making an
informed decision by discussing . . . [t]he potential risks associated with . . . [and t]he probable
result of ingesting the requested aid-in-dying drug . . . [and c]ounsel the qualified individual
about . . . [h]aving another person present when he or she ingests the aid-in-dying drug[;] . . . [n]ot
ingesting the aid-in-dying drug in a public place[;] . . . [and m]aintaining the aid-in-dying drug in
a safe and secure location until the time that the qualified individual will ingest it.”).
62. See id. § 443.1(p) (“‘Self-administer’ means a qualified individual’s affirmative, con-
scious, and physical act of administering and ingesting the aid-in-dying drug. . . .”).
63. Though AB 15 denies authorizing active euthanasia, see id. § 443.16, who would know if
it occurred since, without objective observers, the only witness to the act is dead.
64. See id. § 443.9.
65. See id. § 443.22 (interim “Attending Physician Follow-Up Form”). Though not required
to specify the surrounding circumstances if not personally present at the patient’s death, such
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criminal, administrative, or other proceeding.”66  This would im-
pede investigations by coroners and prosecutors into whether pa-
tients’ deaths involved foul-play. If enacted, AB 15 would thus
supply a shield to crime.
Moreover, if California follows existing practice, the drug regi-
ments of choice are,67 to say the least, not risk-free.68  For exam-
ple, in 2005, an Oregon patient regained consciousness sixty-five
hours after ingesting a lethal prescription and finally died four-
teen days later.69 Again, in 2011, one Oregon patient regained
consciousness approximately fourteen hours following ingestion
and died about thirty-eight hours later; another briefly regained
consciousness and died approximately thirty hours later.70 Fur-
ther, in 2012, another Oregon resident regained consciousness
two days following ingestion, but remained minimally responsive,
and died four days later.71 This is hardly ending life in “a hu-
mane and dignified manner.”72
Finally, once the prescription is written and the lethal drug dis-
pensed, the attending physician’s duty to the patient ends.73 He is
not obliged to reevaluate the patient’s competence before the
drug is taken,74 even though weeks or months have passed.75 He
attending physician, nonetheless, must indicate the cause of death, even if based, for example, on
the hear-say of an interested heir who was present. See id.
66. Id. § 443.19(a).
67. See OREGON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, supra note 46; WASHINGTON’S 2014
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, supra note 46.
68. In our calculation, the total duration between ingestion and death set out in the Oregon
annual reports ranges from one minute to 104 hours and, in the Washington State reports, from
two minutes to forty-one hours.
69. See REP. OF OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, 2005, https://
public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/
Documents/year8.pdf.
70. See REP. OF OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, 2011, https://
public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/
Documents/year14.pdf.
71. See REP. OF OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, 2012, https://
public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/
Documents/year15.pdf. Oregon also reported in 2010, without elaboration, that “[two patients] did
not die after ingestion; [a]nother 2 regurgitated and regained consciousness.” REP. OF OR. PUB.
HEALTH DIV., OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, 2010, https://public.health.oregon.gov/Pro-
viderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/year13.pdf.
72. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.897.
73. The attending physician, however, owes certain reporting duties to the Department of
Public Health after the lethal prescription is written and then after the patient has died. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.9 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of
2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.).
74. California does require patients to sign a form forty-eight hours before consuming the
lethal drug, attesting that they are of sound mind, exercising informed consent, and aware they can
decline ingestion. See id. § 443.11. But neither witnesses nor any independent evaluation is re-
quired to ensure the patient is actually competent and acting voluntarily. Further, the form refers
to “consum[ing]” and “ingest[ing]” the drug, rather than “self-administration,” see id., suggesting
that “swallowing” is all that is needed. The completed form is to be delivered to the attending
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is not obliged to be present when the drug is taken, and, in Ore-
gon and Washington, seldom is.76 Despite claims that it will vin-
dicate patients’ rights, what AB 15 really does is immunize
doctors who prescribe lethal drugs, in “good faith” compliance
with its check-list, from civil and criminal liability and profes-
sional sanctions.77 At bottom, AB 15 is simply a safe-haven for
doctors who would disavow that ancient oath “[t]o please no one
will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause
his death.”78
At a time not so long in the past, our laws were misused to mask
reality. For example, the pre-bellum slave codes equated human
beings with items of property, “reduced[ing] . . . [slaves] to ani-
mals, or real estate, or even kitchen utensils. . . .”79 Reflecting on
this shocking phenomenon, Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit
has observed: “Law can operate as a kind of magic. All that is
necessary is to permit legal legerdemain to create a mask obliter-
ating the human person being dealt with. Looking at the mask . . .
is not to see the human reality on which the mask is imposed.”80
Like the slave codes, AB 15 operates as a kind of magic. By offer-
ing safeguards that serve instead to place patients at risk of
abuse, it employs legal slight-of-hand.81  By calling “aid in dy-
physician and included in the patient’s record, but only if any unused drugs are not returned in the
prescribed manner. Compare id. § 443.11(c)(1–2) with id. § 443.20. Thus, if no drugs remain or if
they are flushed down the drain (and there is nothing to prevent that from happening), there is no
duty to return the form. It is difficult to imagine a more illusory set of procedural protections.
75. For example, eleven Oregon patients, with prescriptions written in 2012 and 2013, died
after ingesting the lethal drug in 2014. See OREGON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, supra note
46. Similarly, Washington State reported a lapse of twenty-five weeks or more between the first
oral request and death for fifteen patients in 2014. See WASHINGTON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY
ACT, supra note 46.
76. Though eighty-three physicians wrote lethal prescriptions for Oregon patients in 2014,
they were present only when fourteen patients ingested the prescribed drugs. See OREGON’S 2014
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, supra note 46.  Similarly, though 109 physicians wrote lethal prescrip-
tions for Washington State patients in 2014, they were present only when seven patients ingested
the prescribed drugs. See WASHINGTON’S 2014 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, supra note 46.
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.14(a–b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016
Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.). Of particular concern is section 443.14(c) that
omits even the minimal safeguard of “good faith compliance.” See id. (“[A] health care provider
shall not be subject to civil, criminal, administrative, disciplinary, employment, credentialing, pro-
fessional discipline, contractual liability, or medical staff action, sanction, or penalty or other
liability for participating in this part, including, but not limited to, [determining a patient’s diag-
nosis, prognosis, capacity, and providing the patient with information or a referral].” (emphasis
added)).
78. The Oath of Hippocrates, ASS’N OF AM. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, http://www.aapson
line.org/ethics/oaths.htm#hippo.
79. John T. Noonan, The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 669 (1984).
80. Id.
81. As one example of legal legerdemain, AB 15 provides that, on the one hand, “[n]othing
in this part may be construed to authorize . . . mercy killing,” and, immediately on the other hand,
“[a]ctions taken in accordance with this part shall not, for any purposes, constitute . . . homi-
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ing”82 practices that simply help patients make themselves dead,
it recites empty incantations.83 By not affirming patients’ lives but
rather abandoning them to their despair, it creates only an illu-
sion of compassion. True compassion, however, “leads to sharing
another’s pain; it does not kill the person whose suffering we can-
not bear.”84 The plain fact is that AB 15 will legalize assisted
suicide, and no legal magic can mask that reality. Should it pass,
I would urge you to veto this dangerous and deceptive bill.
Respectfully submitted,
Stephen L. Mikochik
Many factors have produced the threat disabled people face today.
With fewer children being born, a premium is placed on bearing fetuses
without imperfections. With the changing American family, no one is left
home to care for disabled or elderly members.
Yet, the core reasons are more elemental: First, we have lost the sense
of the transcendent, what we once called the fear of God. Without the con-
viction that there are values above human culture, “everything is negotiable,
everything is open to bargaining: even the first of the fundamental rights,
the right to life.”85 Further, we have lost the sense that, able-bodied or not,
we are each unique images of God and thus each of infinite worth. Finally
and most tragic of all, we have lost the sense that God loves each of us, so
much that He sent His Son to die on a cross for our redemption. Disabled
people are threatened today because, to put it simply, we have lost the sense
of God.
cide. . . .” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.18 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg.
Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess.).
82. See id. § 443.9(a) (entitling the written request form: “REQUEST FOR AN AID-IN-
DYING DRUG TO END MY LIFE IN A HUMANE AND DIGNIFIED MANNER”); Id.
§ 443.1(b) (labeling the lethal drug as “Aid-in-Dying”).
83. The bill simply decrees that conforming actions “shall not, for any purposes, constitute
suicide, assisted suicide, homicide, or elder abuse[.]” Id. § 443.18. See also id. § 443.14(d)(2) (No
conforming action “shall constitute or provide the basis for any claim of neglect or elder
abuse[.]”).
84. St. John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae [Encyclical Letter on the Gospel of Life] ¶ 66 (1995).
85. Id. at ¶ 20.
